Thailand's impressive long-term rate of economic growth has resulted mainly from accumulation of physical capital. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth at the economy-wide level explains about one-third of the aggregate growth of output. However, this TFP growth was due entirely to resource reallocation from lowproductivity sectors, especially agriculture, to higher-productivity industry and services sectors. TFP growth at the sectoral level has been important only in agriculture. Poverty has declined remarkably over time despite a steady increase in income inequality. The rate of decline in poverty incidence has been directly related to the rate of economic growth.
Introduction
All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.
-Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina (1877) Tolstoy opens his great novel with a conjecture: the set of possible ways in which families can be happy is small, but the set of ways of being unhappy is vast. Whether Tolstoy was right about families, something similar may well be true of economic success among nations. There are many more ways of failing economically than of succeeding. If this is true, then to ªnd the secrets of economic success among nations, studying the experience of successful countries is likely to be more fruitful than studying fail- the resources that households and governments need to ªnance the improvements in living conditions that are the basis for improvements in the average quality and duration of human life. But all this is about averages. What about the poorest people? Does growth do anything for them?
The focus of this paper is on the sources of Thailand's economic growth and its relationship to poverty reduction. Section 2 describes long-term growth in Thailand and its economic determinants. Section 3 turns to the sectoral composition of output and productivity growth. Section 4 turns to the records of poverty incidence and inequality in Thailand and their relationship to economic growth. Section 5 provides conclusions.
Long-term economic growth
Following World War II, Thailand was one of the world's poorest countries. Its economy had been stagnant for at least a century (Manorungsan 1989) and it had suffered signiªcant war damage. Most economic observers of the time rated its prospects poorly (Ingram 1971) . By 1996, half a century later, these negative assessments had been replaced by euphoric descriptions of Thailand as a "ªfth tiger," following in the footsteps of the four East Asian Tigers-namely, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Thailand was widely considered a champion of sustained development, having achieved a combination of rapid growth, macroeconomic stability, and steadily declining poverty incidence, extending over several decades. The twin currency and banking crises of 1997-99 interrupted this process, eroding some of the gains that had been made earlier, but subsequent recovery has restored Thailand's long-term growth path. This growth performance is described in Figure 1 , showing the level of real GDP per capita in each year (vertical bars) and its growth rate (solid line) for the period 1951 to 2007. The ªgure identiªes four periods of Thailand's recent economic history: I-Pre-boom (until 1986) ; II-boom (1987 II-boom ( to 1996 ; III-crisis (1997 III-crisis ( to 1999 and IV-recovery (2000 to 2007) . These four periods are summarized in Table 2 . Over the period 1968-86, the average annual growth rate of Thailand's real GNP was 6.7 percent (almost 5 percent per person), compared with an average of 2.4 percent for low and middle-income countries (World Bank 1998) . Then, over the decade 1987-96, the Thai economy boomed, growing at 9.5 percent in real terms. Over this decade, the Thai economy was the fastest growing in the world.
Even more remarkable than the rate of growth over this long period was the stability of the growth. Not a single year of negative growth of real output per head of population was experienced over the four decades from 1958 to 1996, a unique achievement among developing countries (Robinson, Byeon and Teja 1991; Warr and Nidhiprabha 1996) . Thailand's performance was often described as an example others might emulate. Its principal economic institutions, including its central bank, the Bank of Thailand, were cited as examples of competent and stable management.
The crisis of 1997-99 reversed these assessments. Domestically, the economy was in disarray: output and investment were contracting; poverty incidence was rising; the Source: Bank of Thailand, Bangkok, data for 1968 to 1986 National Economic and Social Development Board, Bangkok, data from exchange rate had collapsed following the decision to ºoat the currency in July 1997; the government had been compelled to accept a humiliating IMF bailout package; the ªnancial system was largely bankrupt; and conªdence in the country's economic institutions, including the Bank of Thailand, was shattered. Internationally, Thailand was now characterized as the initiator of a "contagion effect" in Asian ªnancial markets, undermining economic and political stability and bringing economic hardship to millions of people.
The economic damage done by the crisis of 1997-99, and the hardship that resulted, were both substantial. The crisis eroded some of the gains from the economic growth that had been achieved during the long period of economic expansion, but it did not erase them. At the low point of the crisis in 1998, the level of GDP per capita was almost 14 percent below its level only two years earlier, in 1996. Nevertheless, because of the sustained growth that had preceded the crisis, this reduced level of 1998 was still higher than it had been only ªve years before that, in 1993, and was seven times its level in 1951.
Since the crisis, Thailand's economic recovery has been moderate. contraction was initially larger than Indonesia's, but Indonesia did not experience a recovery as large as Thailand's in 1999. It is commonly said that Indonesia's economic crisis was more severe than Thailand's, but using the pre-crisis year of 1996 as a base, their time paths of real GDP, relative to that 1996 base, were remarkably similar. The main difference is that since 2002 Indonesia's recovery has been marginally slower.
Sources of aggregate growth
Where did Thailand's economic growth come from? Explaining long-term growth involves distinguishing between the growth of the factors of production employed and the growth in their productivity, following Solow (1957) . We now discuss a growth accounting exercise for Thailand, covering the years 1980 to 2006. The present section shows this analysis at an aggregate, economy-wide level and the following section disaggregates the analysis by major sector.
The assumption being made in this kind of analysis is that output was primarily supply-constrained; aggregate demand was not the binding constraint on output. This assumption seems reasonable for the period prior to the Asian crisis of 1997-99, but the crisis and recovery periods from 1997 onward were characterized by a deªciency of aggregate demand. A growth accounting framework, which focuses on the determinants of aggregate supply, is therefore of limited relevance for such periods. The data relating to that period are included here mainly for completeness.
Data on labor inputs are adjusted for changes in the quality of the workforce by disaggregating the workforce by the educational characteristics of workers and weighting these components of the workforce using time series wage data for the educational categories concerned. Data on land inputs are similarly adjusted for the changing quality of land inputs by disaggregating by irrigated and non-irrigated land and then re-aggregating these components using data on land prices. In Table 3 , the resulting estimates of factor growth rates are contained in the ªrst column. The second column provides average factor cost shares over time, compiled from factor price data. These factor cost shares impose the assumption of constant returns to scale. The factor cost shares used in the calculations vary over time. The summary data shown in the table are the averages of these shares.
The third column on factor contributions to growth weights the growth rates of factors by their cost shares, producing an estimate of the degree to which the growth of output (6.01 percent) is attributable to the growth of each component. These data are then used to calculate total factor productivity growth as a residual. The ªnal col-umn shows the estimated percentage contribution of each component to the overall growth rate.
The outstanding point is the rapid growth of the physical capital stock. The capital stock grew more rapidly than output and accounted for 51 percent of the growth of output. Growth of the size of the labor force contributed about 12 percent of the growth of output, but improvements in the quality of the labor force made only a modest contribution, explaining less than 4 percent of overall growth. Indeed, the performance of its educational sector has been among the weakest in East Asia. Secondary school participation rates were low and did not improve greatly during the pre-boom and boom periods (Khoman 1993) . Similarly, since the 1960s the expansion of the cultivated land area has been small. Growth of the stock of land was not the source either. TFP growth was seemingly quite important, accounting for onethird of output growth. We will see subsequently, however, that this apparent contribution of TFP growth is not as it appears.
It is perhaps unsurprising that the explanation for Thailand's impressive growth lies primarily with growth of the physical capital stock. Both domestic and foreign investment grew rapidly, but the growth rate of foreign investment was larger, from about 1987 (Warr 1993; Vines and Warr 2003) . Foreign investment plays an important role in introducing new technology and in development of export markets. Nevertheless, the quantitative importance of foreign investment in Thailand's capital stock accumulation is easily exaggerated. Table 4 makes this point by decomposing Thailand's total annual level of investment into three components: domestic private, public, and foreign direct investment (FDI). It does this for each of the four years, 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005 . Of these three components, domestic private investment is by far the largest and FDI is by far the smallest. In 2005 their percentage contributions to the overall level of investment were: 69.5 (private domestic), 58 Asian Economic Papers Poverty Reduction through Long-term Growth: The Thai Experience 26.8 (public), and 3.7 (FDI). Private investment by Thais themselves was the dominant contributor to overall capital accumulation.
How was the investment ªnanced? Did the funds come from domestic savings or from borrowing from abroad? Table 5 presents an accounting of this issue based on the identities that: (i) total investment ϭ household savings ϩ government savings ϩ foreign savings; and (ii) foreign savings ϭ long-term capital inºow ϩ short-term capital inºow-change in international reserves of the central bank. By far the most important source of ªnance was the private savings of Thais themselves.
Contrary to the common perception that Thailand's boom (1987-96) was ªnanced largely by foreign capital, this source, consisting of private FDI plus foreign government investment (Overseas Development Assistance; ODA), accounted for an average of only 5 percent of total investment. During the pre-boom period, FDI accounted for about 61 percent of this inºow of long-term foreign capital and ODA accounted for the other 39 percent. During the boom period, these proportions were 73 and 27 percent, respectively. Short-term capital inºows, consisting of borrowing from abroad plus portfolio inºows plus domestic bank accounts held by foreigners 59 Asian Economic Papers Poverty Reduction through Long-term Growth: The Thai Experience were a more important source, accounting for 23 percent of total investment. During the boom, government dis-saving (budget deªcits) reduced the funds available for investment by 11 percent and increases in the international reserves of the Bank of Thailand reduced it further by 9 percent.
It is instructive to compare the boom period (1987-96) with the pre-boom period (1973-86). The major difference was in the proportion of total investment that was ªnanced by short-term capital inºows. This proportion increased from 2 percent before the boom to 23 percent during the boom. It ªnanced investment, but it also sowed the seeds of the 1997-99 crisis. The accumulated stock of mobile foreignowned capital grew to levels far exceeding the stock of the Bank of Thailand's foreign exchange reserves. If the owners of these funds chose to withdraw them from Thailand, the Bank of Thailand would be unable to defend its ªxed exchange rate. This is precisely what happened in July 1997 (Warr 1999 (Warr , 2005 .
In summary, growth of the physical capital stock was the most important contributor to Thailand's aggregate growth, accounting for 70 percent of all growth over the period 1981 to 2002. This is a similar conclusion to the one reported by Young (1994) and popularized by Krugman (1994) . Most of this investment was ªnanced from Thai domestic private savings. The notion that Thailand's accumulation of physical capital was ªnanced by FDI and/or foreign aid is a myth. Total foreign capital inºows, FDI plus ODA, accounted for only about 5 percent of total investment. ODA was less than one-third of this foreign capital inºow. That is, the quantity of ODA explains only 1.5 percent of total investment over this period, and thus under 1 percent of total growth.
Before leaving the subject of Thailand's aggregate economic performance, one further topic requires attention. Why has Thailand's recovery been so slow? As noted previously, the crisis was a contraction in aggregate demand, rather than a contraction in productive capacity. Labor and capital were underutilized because there was insufªcient demand for Thai output. Where did this contraction in demand come from? Table 6 addresses this point. The upper section of the table shows the composition of expenditure on GDP in Thailand during the pre-crisis boom , the crisis (1997-99) and the post-crisis recovery period . During the crisis, the share of investment in GDP collapsed by 13 percentage points. Investor conªdence was severely damaged by the events surrounding the crisis and during the postcrisis recovery period, this share did not recover sufªciently to restore Thailand's long-term rate of growth.
Why did this occur? High interest rates are not the answer. Although Thailand's interest rates increased during the crisis, they have been at historically low levels since the year 2000. A clue is provided by Figure 4 , which shows the relationship between the stock exchange index for Thailand (SET) and the level of private investment. Investment follows the SET, but with a lag. The stock exchange index may be viewed as an indicator of investor conªdence. Investors have lost conªdence in the capacity of the Thai economy to generate a satisfactory return on their investments.
This problem is not unique to Thailand. Table 6 shows similar calculations for two other crisis-affected economies, Indonesia and Malaysia. The pattern is similar. Finally, Figure 5 shows annual data on the share of investment in GDP in ªve crisis- affected East Asian economies: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea. Although the contraction of private investment in Thailand is at least as large as any other (Malaysia is similar), the ªgure shows that the problem of sluggish post-crisis recovery of investment is shared by several East Asian economies. It would not seem appropriate to look for country-speciªc causes. The decline of investor conªdence is region-wide, at least among the countries seriously affected by the crisis. The crisis showed the possibility that investors could be bankrupted by macroeconomic events over which they have no control and where they have little or no forewarning.
Sectoral economic performance and productivity growth
How do the major sectors of the Thai economy compare in terms of productivity growth? Table 2 summarizes the sectoral composition of Thailand's growth performance since 1968. The growth of industry, especially export-oriented manufacturing, has far outstripped agriculture, implying that agriculture's share of GDP has declined signiªcantly. This point is conªrmed by Figure 6 , which shows the rapidly changing composition of output in Thailand.
Observations of this kind are typical for rapidly growing economies. As aggregate output per person expands, agriculture tends to contract as a share of total output, while the share of industry expands. But a common misinterpretation of this phenomenon is that the agricultural sector is "stagnant" while industry is "dynamic."
The misinterpretation lies in confusing the fact that the level of factor productivity in agriculture tends to be lower than in industry (and in services) with differences in the rate of growth of productivity. The data for Thailand indicate that although the level of factor productivity is indeed lower in agriculture, the growth of productivity has been much more rapid there than in other sectors. The key point is that Thai agriculture has been expanding its output, albeit more slowly than the rest of the economy, with declining shares of the nation's resources.
The evidence for this conclusion is found in Table 7 . This table summarizes a set of calculations for agriculture, industry, and services that mirror the aggregate analysis reported in Table 3 and that extend earlier calculations reported in Sussankarn and Tinakorn (1998) . The data used in this analysis again cover the years 1980 to 2006 and include:
• employment of labor by educational category by sector;
• physical capital used by each sector;
• use of land in agriculture, adjusted by the extent of irrigation coverage; and • cost shares for each of the above factors of production by sector. For convenience, the ªrst column of Table 7 repeats some of the ªndings at the aggregate level, discussed previously. The sectoral ªndings may be summarized as follows. First, although output (value-added) grew more slowly in agriculture (3.11 percent) than in either industry (7.84 percent) or services (5.49 percent), it was the only major sector to record positive total factor productivity (TFP) growth. This TFP growth in agriculture contributed 6.4 percent of the overall growth of GDP. In agriculture, the growth of output (value-added) of 3.11 percent per year was achieved by factor input growth of 1.19 percent and TFP growth of 1.92 percent. TFP growth therefore accounted for 62 percent of the growth of value-added in agriculture.
Second, the analysis decomposes the aggregate productivity growth component just described into one component due to growth in productivity in individual sectors, each weighted by its share of GDP, and a second component due to the reallocation of resources among sectors of differing total factor productivity. This analysis indicates that the level of factor productivity in agriculture remained signiªcantly lower than elsewhere in the economy, despite its higher TFP growth over this period. The movement of factors of production out of agriculture thus further contributed to economic growth by raising the productivity of these factors. Indeed, this reallocation effect contributed 35 percent of the growth of aggregate output that actually occurred. It was almost eight times as important for overall growth as the growth in the productivity of the factors that remained within agriculture.
The results of the analysis indicate that agriculture's contribution to economic growth in Thailand included impressive rates of TFP growth. However, its main 64 Asian Economic Papers Poverty Reduction through Long-term Growth: The Thai Experience contribution occurred through releasing resources that could be used more productively elsewhere, while still maintaining output, rather than through expansion of agricultural output. It is seriously wrong to characterize Thai agriculture as stagnant, based merely on the fact that output growth has been slower in agriculture than in other sectors. If agriculture had really been stagnant, economic growth would have been substantially lower because it would not have been possible to raise productivity signiªcantly within agriculture or to release resources massively while still maintaining moderate growth of output. Table 8 now summarizes the results of this analysis by showing in the ªrst column, the contributions to overall growth of aggregate factor growth (66 percent of total growth) and aggregate measures TFP (34 percent). It then decomposes this aggregate TFP growth into its sectoral components and the part due to the reallocation of resources from low productivity sectors (mainly agriculture) to higher productivity sectors (mainly industry). This distinction was apparently ªrst quantiªed empirically by Jorgenson (1988) in the context of U.S. productivity growth, although Kuznets had previously noted the analytical issue. Despite the positive TFP growth generated in agriculture, TFP growth in industry and services sectors was marginally negative, canceling the effect of the productivity growth in agriculture. As a result, the economy-wide aggregate of sector-level TFP growth was roughly zero. At the economy-wide level, TFP growth is the sum of (i) the aggregate of sector-level TFP growth and (ii) the reallocation effect. Because the ªrst was zero, all of the 34 percent of GDP growth accounted for by growth of aggregate TFP can be attributed to the reallocation effect-the movement of resources from low productivity sectors (especially agriculture) to higher productivity sectors. The second column of Table 7 shows that these broad qualitative conclusions are not reversed if the analysis is conªned only to the resource-constrained, pre-crisis period.
Poverty incidence and inequality
Is economic growth really so important? Do the poor actually beneªt from it, or only the rich? Within Thailand, as elsewhere, there is considerable debate about these matters. Before turning to the relationship between poverty incidence and economic growth, some characteristics of poverty in Thailand will be reviewed. Despite much dispute about measurement and conceptual issues, all major studies of poverty incidence and inequality in Thailand agree on some basic points:
• Poverty is concentrated in rural areas, especially in the Northeastern and Northern regions.
• Absolute poverty has declined dramatically over recent decades, but inequality has increased.
• The long-term decline in poverty incidence was not conªned to the capital, Bangkok, or its immediate environs, or to urban areas in general, but occurred in rural areas as well. Since 1988, the largest absolute decline in poverty incidence occurred in the poorest region of the country, the Northeast.
• Large families are more likely to be poor than smaller families.
• Farming families operating small areas of land are more likely to be poor than those operating larger areas.
• Households headed by persons with low levels of education are much more likely to be poor than others.
The following discussion draws upon the ofªcial poverty estimates produced by the Thai government's National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), which, like all other available poverty estimates, are based upon the household incomes collected in the National Statistical Ofªce's Socio-economic Survey (SES) household survey data. Despite their imperfections, these are the only data available covering a long time period. These survey data have been collected since 1962. The early data were based on small samples, but their reliability has improved steadily, and since 1988 the raw data have been available in electronic form. A difªculty in comparing these data over time is that the poverty line has been revised several times, changing upward the real purchasing power that it represents. Table 9 summarizes the author's attempts to compile a long-term series on poverty incidence, based on a consistent poverty line-one held constant in real purchasing powerfrom 1962 to 2006. areas), and rural areas, respectively. Poverty incidence is highest in the rural areas, followed by outer urban, and lowest in the inner urban areas. When these data are recalculated in terms of the share of each of these residential areas in the total number of poor people and then the share of the total population, as in the last two rows of the table, respectively, a striking point emerges. In 2006, rural areas accounted for 86 percent of the total number of poor people but only 64 percent of the total population.
Declining poverty incidence, rising inequality
The ªnal column of Table 9 shows the Gini coefªcient of inequality. This index potentially takes values between zero and one, with higher values indicating greater inequality. The index for Thailand rose signiªcantly over the 20 years shown. Combined with the reduction in absolute poverty, which occurred at the same time, this means that the real incomes of the poor increased with economic growth, but the incomes of the rich increased even faster.
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Poverty Reduction through Long-term Growth: The Thai Experience These data are depicted graphically in Figure 7 . The data reveal a considerable decline in poverty incidence up to 1996, a moderate increase to 1998, and a further increase over the following two years. Over the eight years from 1988 to 1996, measured poverty incidence declined by an enormous 21.4 percent of the population, an average rate of decline in poverty incidence of 2.7 percentage points per year. That is, each year, on average 2.7 percent of the population moved from incomes below the poverty line to incomes above it. Over the ensuing two years ending in 1998 poverty incidence increased by 1.5 percent of the population. Alternatively, over the eight years ending in 1996 the absolute number of persons in poverty declined by 11.1 million (from 17.9 million to 6.8 million); over the following two years the number increased by 1 million (from 6.8 to 7.9 million). Thus, according to the ofªcial data, measured in terms of absolute numbers of people in poverty, the crisis reversed 9 percent of the poverty reduction that had occurred during the eight-year period of economic boom immediately preceding the crisis. Table 9 .
ber of poor is smaller than its share of the total population. Poverty is an especially important problem among rural people, particularly in the Northeast.
More dramatic than any of these data, however, are recently released data on the relationship between poverty incidence and education. According to the NESDB's data, of the total number of poor people in 2002, 94.7 percent had received primary or less education. A further 2.8 percent had lower secondary education, 1.7 percent upper secondary, 0.48 percent had vocational qualiªcations and 0.31 percent had graduated from universities. Thailand's poor are overwhelmingly uneducated, rural, and living in large families. However, they are not necessarily landless. Many of the rural poor do own small quantities of agricultural land.
Poverty reduction and economic growth
What caused the long-term decline in poverty incidence? It is obvious that over the long term, sustained economic growth is a necessary condition for large-scale poverty alleviation. No amount of redistribution could turn a poor country into a rich one. Long-term improvements in education have undoubtedly been important, but despite the limitations of the underlying SES data, a reasonably clear statistical picture also emerges on the short-term relationship between poverty reductions and the rate of economic growth. The data are summarized in Figure 9 , which plots the relationship between changes in poverty incidence, calculated from the data used in Table 9 , and the real rate of growth of GDP over the corresponding period. Although the number of data points is small, the implications seem clear. Periods of more rapid economic growth were associated with more rapid reductions in the level of absolute poverty incidence. Moderately rapid growth from 1962 to 1981 coincided with steadily declining poverty incidence. Reduced growth in Thailand caused by the world recession in the early to mid 1980s coincided with worsening poverty incidence in the years 1981 to 1986. Then, Thailand's economic boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with dramatically reduced poverty incidence. Finally, the contraction following the crisis of 1997-99 led to increased poverty incidence. The recovery since the crisis has been associated with signiªcant poverty reduction.
As shown in Figure 9 , the correlation between these two variables is unmistakable. However, one pair of observations is a clear outlier-the data point corresponding to the period 1996-98, which captures the major impact of the Asian ªnancial crisis. The correlation between poverty reduction and growth, based on data for the preand post-Asian ªnancial crisis years, would predict that a large decline in GDP such as the one that occurred during the crisis would result in a much larger increase in poverty incidence than actually occurred. This point is examined more systematically in Table 10 and Figure 10 . Source: Author's calculations using poverty data as in Table 9 and GDP data from NESDB, Bangkok. between the rate of change of poverty incidence (negative values mean a decline in poverty incidence), the dependent variable, and the rate of GDP growth over the corresponding period, the independent variable. The ªrst regression includes all data points. The estimated coefªcient is negative as expected (the faster the growth, the greater the poverty reduction) and signiªcant at the 5 percent level.
The second equation is the same except that the data point for 1996-98, which is the point most closely corresponding to the Asian ªnancial crisis period of 1997-99, is omitted. The estimated coefªcient is somewhat larger and again signiªcant at the 5 percent level. This second equation is then used to predict the change in poverty incidence that would be expected to result from the reduction in real GDP observed in the crisis. The results are summarized in Figure 10 . An annual rate of GDP growth of -6.5 percent would be expected to result in an annual increase in poverty incidence of 4.52 percent. The 95 percent conªdence interval around this prediction is [6.12, 2.92]. However, the observed annual increase in poverty incidence ("Crisis: actual" in the ªgure) was only 0.8 percent, well outside this 95 percent conªdence interval. Poverty did not increase nearly as much as would be predicted on the basis of the contraction in real GDP.
Several hypotheses can be advanced for this seeming anomaly. One is that the dramatic depreciation of the baht that immediately followed the crisis raised the prices of exported commodities, including most major agricultural goods. This beneªted the rural poor but harmed the urban poor. The net effect may have been a reduction in poverty incidence. Another hypothesis is that Thai people assisted one another to an unusual extent during the crisis. Urban workers, laid off from construction and manufacturing employment, returned to their extended family base in the provinces. There they were absorbed into the business activities of the extended family and the loss of household income (on which the poverty calculations are based) was much less than would have otherwise occurred.
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Inequality and economic growth
As noted previously, Thailand's Gini coefªcient has increased signiªcantly while poverty incidence has declined. Another way of demonstrating the increase in inequality is through income shares. Figure 11 does this using quintile shares. Since 1975-76, the income share of the poorest quintile group (quintile I, the poorest 20 percent of the population) has declined steadily. The same is true of all quintile groups except the richest (quintile V). Why has this happened?
It was shown earlier that a clear short-term relationship exists between reductions in poverty and economic growth. Can a relationship of this kind can be found between the increase in inequality over time and the rate of growth? This issue is explored in Figure 12 . No correlation is apparent. The rate of growth does not seem to be a signiªcant determinant of short-term changes in the level of inequality. Other social factors are undoubtedly playing a role, but research on this issue remains inconclusive.
One possible explanation is explored in Figure 13 . Consider the share of GDP that is attributable to unskilled labor alone, estimated by taking the real wage of unskilled labor and comparing it with the value of real GDP per worker employed. The difference between the two is the part of GDP that is paid to factors other than raw unskilled labor: human capital (the difference between actual wages and unskilled 72 Asian Economic Papers Poverty Reduction through Long-term Growth: The Thai Experience Source: Author's calculations using inequality data as in Table 9 and GDP data from NESDB, Bangkok.
wages), physical capital, and land. The results are striking. Over the period from the early 1980s to the ªrst half of this decade, the unskilled labor share of GDP, as estimated here, declined from roughly one-third to about 22 percent. The increase in inequality seemingly relates to labor market behavior. Real wages of unskilled labor have not kept pace with GDP growth. Explanations for this outcome may involve Lewis-type elasticity of labor supply, supplemented by the role of unskilled labor migration from neighboring countries Laos, Cambodia, and especially Burma.
Conclusions: Thailand's success
The experience of Thailand over the past half century conªrms the importance of sustained economic growth, at least in poor countries, for the achievement of improved living conditions. Thailand's recovery from the crisis of 1997-99 is now complete, despite several unexpected setbacks, including rural drought, Asian inºu-enza, SARS, political violence in the South, the tsunami Burma/Myanmar illustrates this point. In 1960, the two countries were similarly impoverished. Since then, Burma's economic policies have been closed and deeply suspicious of the outside world. Internally, markets have been suppressed and controloriented solutions have been favored for most economic problems. The difference in living standards today is stark. The majority of the Burmese people remain poor to an extent that is only a distant memory for most Thais.
Not all aspects of the Thai development strategy have been similarly successful. Inequality has increased at the same time as absolute poverty has declined. The underlying causes of this increase in inequality are still only partially understood. Education policy remains a serious problem. The system of primary and secondary education remains archaic. Standards of rural education in particular remain low and the poor quality of education received by most rural Thais dooms them to lives of economic disadvantage even when they migrate to the urban centers. The longterm neglect of environmental degradation is a further failure of Thai policy. This applies to pollution control, deforestation (including the denudation of coastal mangrove forests), and the wasteful management of the country's water resources.
